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Emergency Futures: Exception, Urgency, Interval, Hope 
 
Emergency as a descriptor, technique and legal-political device has become a taken-
for-granted way of apprehending and governing events and situations. In this paper, 
I explore the temporality of emergency, through reflections on the use of 
declarations of emergency in relation to US-based Black Lives Matter protests. I do 
so in the context of claims and counter claims about contemporary transformations 
in what Rheinhart Kosselleck (2004: 241) terms the ‘expected otherness of the future’. 
Arguing for changes in the form of the ‘expected otherness of the future’ rather than 
its simple loss, disappearance or absence, I describe how emergency operates around 
a temporality of exceptionality, urgency, and interval. Formal and informal 
declarations of emergency are, in addition, imbued with hope: the hope that time 
remains and action can make a difference to events. What the use of declarations of 
emergency by Black Lives Matter activists does is disrupt the geo-historically 
specific divide between the everyday and emergency by naming conditions that mix 
the endemic and the evental as emergencies. In the spark of hope that is the act of 
declaring that ongoing conditions should be treated as emergencies, the ‘otherness of 
the future’ folds into and becomes part of the present.  
 
Keywords: Emergency, Futures, Black Lives Matter, Everyday, Declarations of 
Emergency 
 
 
Emergency Futures: Exception, Urgency, Interval, Hope 
 
Introduction: ‘In’ an emergency  
 
Two activists take the stage and interrupt a netroots nation townhall meeting 
in Phoenix, Arizona. Part of a coalition of organisations concerned with racial justice 
(‘Black Lives Matter’, ‘Dream Defenders’, ‘Black Alliance for Just Immigration’), the 
action draws attention to the slow and fast state violences that damage and destroy 
Black lives. On taking the stage, Patrisse Cullors – one of the co-founders of Black 
Lives Matter – spoke of death with urgency, indignation and rage:  
 
‘Let’s be clear - every single day folks are dying, not, not being able to take 
another breath … We are in a state of emergency. We are in a state of 
emergency. And if you don’t feel that emergency, you are not human’.  
 
In an interview some weeks later, Cullors talked about the action, including her 
declaration of emergency:     
 
‘When I went on stage and I said, ‘this is a state of emergency’ – I am not using 
that as hyperbole. Any other racial group whose symbols are being burned 
down and homes are being burned down; whose community members are 
being killed on a daily basis; who are completely dying of starvation, have the 
high unemployment rates and infant mortality rates - any other community 
this would be seen as an opportunity to support and uplift and try and deal 
with the crisis. That’s actually not what’s happening in the Black community, 
so I think the iteration that we are in a state of emergency, and we want elected 
officials to treat it as such, is so important’i.  
 
On the one year anniversary of the shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, 
Missouri, U.S.A that is credited with sparking the Black Lives Matter protests and 
movement, a state of emergency is issued by St. Louis Countyii. Issued by the county 
executive officer on the 10th August, 2015, the order legitimises a range of 
exceptional actions. They include that:  
 
‘The superintendent of the St. Louis County Police Department shall exercise 
all powers and duties necessary with respect to preservation of order, 
prevention of crimes and misdemeanours, apprehension and arrest, conserving 
the peace and other police and law enforcement functions.’ 
 
The declaration is legitimised by the county executive officer through reference to a 
near past of actual disorder and a potential future of harm:   
 
‘In light of last night’s violence and unrest in the City of Ferguson, and the 
potential for harm to persons and property, I am exercising my authority as 
county executive to issue a state of emergency, effective immediately’.iii 
 
What does it mean to live ‘in’ a state of emergency? In Patrisse Cullors’ 
emergency statement, naming a state of emergency is to recognise and interrupt an 
already existing condition of existence that mixes the endemic and evental as 
enduring racist violence intensifies and is reproduced in scenes of police repression, 
and other forms and processes of state violence become ordinary. In the second 
emergency statement, St Louis County declare a temporary but in the present open-
ended suspension of ordinary law that legitimises extraordinary powers and actions 
that long ago became ordinary as techniques of government. The declaration 
depends on and reproduces a fictitious line between emergency and a normality that 
has been in the past, and should be and can be returned to in the future. For those 
already living in emergency conditons, there is no such line. Emergency is the 
present and the past and, unless interrupted, will be the future. For Black lives, it is a 
condition of existence bound up with slow and fast deaths (Berlant 2011) and forms 
of endurance (Povinelli 2011). And, yet, there is hope in naming enduring conditions 
as an emergency: the hope for a future response that would bring to an end the 
unbearable present of systematic and evental harms. There is also a hope, though, in 
the state’s declaration of a state of emergency: the hope for a future in which the 
disruption and energies of present protest named as ‘violence and unrest’ have been 
brought to order, ended, and a pre-emergency normality returned to - a pre-
emergency normality that remains an emergency for Black lives.  
In the early twenty-first century, the term ‘emergency’ is used in relation to 
multiple events or situations across different domains of life and across different 
functional sectors (Anderson 2016). Although a genealogy of the term remains to be 
written, what is assumed to be common across the events or situations named as 
emergencies today is a particular quality. It is a quality of unpredictable, rapid 
change and the time of a turning point. Typically, an event or situation is named as 
an emergency if urgent, time-limited action is deemed necessary to forestall, stop or 
otherwise affect some kind of undesired future. Central to uses of the term 
emergency is, then, a sense that something valued (life, health, security) is at risk 
and, importantly, a sense that there is a limited time within which to curtail 
irreparable harm or damage to whatever it is that has been valued. Beginning with 
emergency in the Black Lives Matter movement reminds us that emergency has 
never only been a technique of the state, even if critical inquiry has, in the main, 
focused on intensifications of sovereign power in emergency situations (on which 
see Agamben 2005; Neal 2006; Adey, Anderson, Graham 2015). Progressive 
organisations orientated towards social justice frequently make strategic use of the 
term emergency to generate urgencies with the hope of translating un- or barely- 
bearable conditions into ethical or political scenes demanding response. Consider, 
for example, mobilisation of the idea/affect that we are ‘in’ a ‘climate emergency’ by 
climate change activists as a counter to the deferrel of action to an ever receding 
horizon (see, for example, Sutton and Spratt 2008). Or, for another example, consider 
movements for prison reform that name mass incarceration as a present emergency 
in a bid to interrupt the replacement of the welfare state by the penal state and its 
forms of violence (Gilmore 2006). Emergency is, then, one of a number of geo-
historically specific ‘modes of eventfulness’ (Berlant 2011; Anderson 2016) that 
constitute the affective-ideational resources available to make sense of how existing 
states of affairs fall apart as harms, damages and losses materialise. Co-existing with 
other modes such as disaster, apocalypse, collapse, shock, incident and crisis, 
emergency involves particular ways of relating past, present and future as well as 
specific assumptions about the occurrence, impact and end of events.  
If emergency is a now ubiquitous resource for apprehending, diagnosing and 
living in the present, what distinguishes emergency from other modes of 
eventfulness? And what does understanding the temporality specific to emergency 
contribute to the current concern in sociology and elsewhere with futures? I pose 
these questions in the midst of contradictory, dissonant accounts of the future today 
and the novelty of transformations in relations between present and future. What 
various accounts share is a sense of a crisis in what Kosselleck (2004: 241) terms the 
‘expected otherness of the future’ that underpinned historical temporality. The 
supposed crisis, and I will have cause to question these claims below, involves the 
absence, loss or disappearance of the future as unanticipatable novelty. Claims are 
made that the affective experience of the present combines a sense of repetition 
alongside the absence of a sense of the possibility of historical transformation. Being 
a crisis though, the otherness of the future is still held on to, even as it frays. Lauren 
Berlant (2011), for example, tracks how people just about hold on to fraying good life 
fantasies that partly depend on the continuation of ideas of progress. In the midst of 
the diagnosis of a loss of the idea and promise of the otherness of the future, what to 
make of the ubiquity of emergency and its particular ways of folding futures into the 
present? Or, to put the question differently, how has emergency become a means of 
relating to the presence or absence of the ‘expected otherness of the future’?          
The paper addresses this question in three parts. In section one, I summarise 
claims about transformations in the relation between present and future, in 
particular diagnoses of the loss or disappearance of the otherness of the future, and 
introduce the concept of ‘styles’ (Anderson 2010) of relating to the future. The 
following section argues that the emergency as a technique is organised around four 
temporalities - exceptionality, urgency, interval and hope. Section three then returns 
to the tension between the two ways of being ‘in’ emergency that I began with and 
argues that the emergency declarations can be acts of hope that produce a particular 
kind of ‘emergency present’. In conclusion, I summarise what becomes of the 
relation between present and future in disruptions to the geo-historically specific 
distinction between emergency and everyday.  
 
Section One: Emergency and the Loss of the Future 
 
A range of critical diagnoses of the politics and culture of the neoliberal 
present revolve around claims of transformations in relations with futurity. Work 
has stressed how faith in the future as radically new has waned or ended. Beradi 
(2011), for example, writes of the ‘slow cancellation’ of the future, in which 
modernist faith in the transformatory powers of the future, a faith that was always 
unevenly distributed and only ever available to some, has ended. In similar terms, 
Fisher (2014) writes of how faith in the future is interrupted by lost futures, futures 
that have failed to happen, that return to haunt the present. What is lost, so Fisher 
argues, is a sense of the future’s disruptiveness, of its potential to become otherwise. 
This sense of the absence of the otherness of the future is produced, in part, through 
ways of delegitimising other futures as unrealistic in the midst of structures of 
feeling marked by apathy, resignation or acquiescence to a present that harms. The 
best example of this is what Fisher (2009) describes as ‘capitalist realism’ – defined 
by him as a pervasive sense of the inevitability of current ways of arranging 
economy (‘There is no alternative’) and the linked loss of hope in alternatives. It 
involves the absence of the imagination for something different or, put differently, 
the absence of the possibility of evental ruptures in the continuity of experience, of 
untimely events that are ‘out of joint’ and threaten or promise something new. 
Developing from Fisher’s account, Gilbert (2015: 33) diagnoses ‘disaffected consent’ 
as a neoliberal structure of feeling that involves a closing of the possibility of other 
futures through a combination of ‘a profound dissatisfaction with both the 
consequences and ideological premises of the neoliberal project’, that might generate 
forms of dissent, and ‘a general acquiescence with that project, a degree of deference’ 
together with ‘a belief that it cannot be effectively challenged’.                                                                                  
 This diagnosis of the loss of the otherness of the future is frequently 
accompanied by a claim that the character of the present changes, with the 
emergence of what Rosa (2013) calls a ‘frenetic standstill’ (15). Cunningham (2015, no 
pagination, emphasis in original) summarises this claim: ‘Cut loose from historical 
narrative, the felt experience of the present is one of an ongoing state of transition, 
which tends to present itself less as a sense of possibility of the truly new than as a 
paradoxically frenzied sense of repetition’. Of course, we can question Cunningham’s 
assertion that there is a single ‘felt experience’. Nevertheless, what this work shows 
is the looping of relations with futures into the tones, habits, infrastructures and 
practices of the present. However, even within the limited parameters of 
understanding contemporary Western neoliberalisms, and little is said about 
relations with futures in the majority world, this now familiar story of the end of the 
future can be nuanced. Other work has attempted to move beyond a narrative of 
loss, disappearance and absence by describing the emergence of new, specific 
relations with futures. Here the claim is that, first, otherness has been domesticated 
through constant anticipation and, second, otherness takes one dominant form - the 
catastrophic or apocalyptic.   
Focusing on the nexus between (new)media and state practices of anticipation 
in relation to events including terrorism and climate change, Grusin (2010) tracks 
multiple ways in which futures are anticipated – or premediated – before they 
happen. Premediation does not involve a definitive prediction of what the future 
will be. Instead, it involves a multiplication of the possibilities surrounding a future 
event. Bringing multiple ‘premediated’ futures into the present is understood, by 
Grusin, as a way of attempting to eradicate the event that cannot be comprehended, 
the event that escapes its frame, the event that catches unaware and opens a 
radically new future. Instead, the present is saturated by possibilities of what could 
happen; possibilities that may be felt through tones of resignation, familiarity, 
nervousness and fatalism rather than shock or surprise. In the midst of shifts in 
thresholds of expectation and anticipation, actual disruptive events become as 
blends of the already anticipated and the unanticipated, felt through complex 
mixtures of shock and familiarity, excitement and boredom, disbelief and 
confirmation. At the same time, other work argues that the otherness of the future 
has been reduced to one dominant form – the catastrophic or apocalyptic (see Calder 
Williams 2011; Aradau & Van Munster 2011). By reference to the end as terminus 
(with or without the revelatory moment of the apocoplyptic), the present become a 
prefiguration of the future disaster. A figure of otherness, given that catastrophe 
involves an overturning of what is that breaks with continuity, reducing futures to 
the catastrophic simultaneously generates continuities. From terrorism to trans-
species epidemics, future catastrophes are governed as if present in embryonic form 
in the present. Neoliberal order is secured through organising attention to what 
Povinelli et al (2014, no pagination) name as ‘”the end” (terminal futures, finitude)’. 
As with premediation, catastrophic futures become part of an already tensed 
present. Focusing on climate change, Hulme (2009), for example, connects the 
repetition of catastrophic scenes of destruction to apathy, indifference, and other 
modes of non- or inaction that enact a sense of the inevitability of “the end”.   
How, then, to understand invocations of emergency in the midst of this 
widespread sense of some form of transformation in the otherness of the future? We 
could, for example, understand emergency as a legal-political tool orientated to the 
continuation of the present and the erasure of the future as otherness. Consider, for 
example, how ‘state of emergency’ legislation exists as a now normal legal-political 
tool typically used for the ending of some kind of threatening future. To declare an 
emergency is, on the one hand, to recognise that something that threatens to bring 
about a different and undesired future is emerging and, on the other, to mobilise 
resources to ensure that a now categorised event does not come to pass. We see this 
double recognition and containment of the otherness of the future in the integral role 
of ‘state of emergency’ legislation in managing dissent and revolt in colonialism. As 
Hussein (2003) shows, declarations of a state of emergency were a key technique for 
the maintenance and continuation of colonial regimes. The ‘state of emergency’ was 
a means of ending anticipated futures of disorder and change. Today, the claim that 
the ‘state of emergency’ has become the norm captures a doubled sense of the 
becoming routine and unsurprising of a legal-political technique and the way in 
which the exceptional and unexceptional fold with one another and become 
indistinct. The making of emergency statements and the use of emergency 
techniques becomes a way of attempting to ensure the perpetual continuation of 
present arrangements in a linear time of before, during and after.  
However, whilst the extension of the ‘state of emergency’ may attempt to 
ensure that disruptive futures may never come to pass the diagnosis of the loss of 
the otherness of the future does not quite fit with uses of emergency. Relating to the 
future as an occasion for emergencies that have not yet happened introduces a sense 
of contingency into the present arrangement of things. The present is full of 
anticipated and actual disruptions, that bring with them a sense that the present is 
changing, and the future might be otherwise unless government happens. Of course, 
those future emergencies are named, categorised and rendered governable, but there 
is simultaneously a sense of the capacity of events as emergencies to surprise. 
Emergency is an occasion, perhaps, when government is brought into contact with 
that which is outside it and that which threatens to exceed its capacities. By which I 
mean that there is always the possibility that events governed as emergencies may 
exceed attempts to bring them to an end. Consider all the work needed to reproduce 
the (always-already unequally attached to and for many long ago lost) aura and 
promise that the state is in control when faced by events. For example, state 
sovereignty is enacted through images of heroic emergency response or the presence 
of elected politicians in the midst of scenes of destruction, damage and loss. 
Exceptional scenes of emergency provide occasion for contemporary forms of 
mediatised, diffuse, acclamation and glorification (and their opposite). We might 
also understand emergency exercises and inquiries as governmental techniques that 
stage possible future emergencies or actual past emergencies in order to repeat and 
sustain the fragile promise that government will be able to meet the next event.  
 So the time of emergency cannot quite be made to fit the narrative of the loss 
of the future and the contemporaneous production of a ‘time without time’, or an 
‘ever more congealed and futureless present’ (Crary 2014: 35). And, whilst often 
collapsed in practice and analysis, the otherness of the future takes a different shape 
in emergency than it does in the form of the apocalyptic or catastrophic. In the 
remainder of the paper I diagnose the style (or styles) of relating to the future that 
are common across enactments of emergency as technique and term. A style is a geo-
historically specific form of relation between past, present and future, examples 
include time as linear, as cyclical, as evental or as pre-destined. The concept 
downplays ontological claims about what the future is or is not in favour of 
attending to the manner through which ‘the future’ eventuates (as surprise, as 
continuity, as un-anticipatable, as repetition and so on). It is a means, then, of 
attending to the multiple, specific forms of relations between past, present, future 
and other temporal categories without presuming that form before analysis. How, 
then, to characterise the style(s) of relating to the future that characterise emergency? 
Let’s start with how emergency typically functions as one resource amongst others –
catastrophe, crisis and so on – for governing the present.         
 
Section Two: Emergency Times 
   
As a term of and for governance, emergency is typically used to name a 
discrete event that breaks with, interrupts, or overturns a supposedly stable 
everyday. For example, the use of the term ‘emergency’ by the emergency services of 
Europe and North America (such as the UK Fire and Rescue service) signifies a 
punctual event happening at a single or set of connected sites that is governed by 
being responded to within a temporary, demarcated ‘scene’ (or set of ‘scenes’). In 
many respects, the services deal with what might be called ‘everyday emergencies’: 
expected occurrences that happen predictably as part of the life of distributed, 
dynamic infrastructures (such as fires or traffic accidents). However, even if the 
event is of a named and known type and even if protocols and other techniques of 
preparation preexist the event, in the scene of emergency ordinary life is shattered 
and something disassembles, to paraphrase Žižek (2014) on the event.  
If seen only from the perspective of emergency as a term of and for 
governance, the first typical temporality of emergency is of the exception. The most 
significant treatment of emergency as exception is by Carl Schmitt (2006) in the 
context of his infamous definition of sovereignty: ‘Sovereign is he who decides on 
the exception’ (Agamben 2005). We might interpret the declaration of a state of 
emergency by St Louis County in this context – as a periodic intensification of 
sovereign power based on a decision that an emergency is happening or will happen 
and a decision on the exceptional measures that can be used (by services, military 
troops, legislatures, etc.) to handle the actual or potential emergency. Yet in the 
background to some of Schmitt’s (2006: 15) comments on constitutional liberalism in 
Political Theology is the idea that the event itself provides the exception (an exception 
that both pre-exists the sovereign decision and is intensified and transformed by the 
decision). Whilst events governed as emergencies may be felt through registers in 
addition to surprise and relate in complex ways to ordinary life, starting with the 
exception reminds us that governing through emergency involves a (contestable) 
claim that some kind of event has happened, is happening, or will happen.  
 The category of emergency does not, however, name only an exception. If we 
stay a little longer with uses of the term in efforts to govern events and life we find 
that it is inseperable from a series of other temporalities. To designate an event or 
situation as an emergency is to demand an urgent response: the claim is that action is 
necessary immediately in order to meet the event that becomes the exception. 
Indeed, we could say that emergency is counter to the suspended time of waiting. 
Folded into the term is a sense of urgency: an insistent force that compels action to 
forestall or end some form of harm, damage or loss (see, for example, Žižek (2006) on 
the ‘war on terror’ and ‘all pervasive sense of urgency’).  
The sense of urgency that is part of emergency involves two interrelated 
temporalities in addition to exceptionality. First, it involves the presence of (or 
construction of a sense of) an on-rushing future that severs the present from the past 
and compresses the time for decision and action. The first time, then, is the time of 
an omnipresent Present: there is no time except the time of now that requires some 
form of urgent action. There are resonances here with Nowotny’s (1994: 50) 
discussion of an ‘extended present’, in which the future “is increasingly 
overshadowed by the problems which are opening up in the present”. The urgency 
of the temporary event necessitates and calls forth similarly urgent action, in a 
manner that is slightly different to the extension of the horizon of planning that 
Nowotny diagnoses as central to the emergence of the ‘extended present’ and loss of 
‘the future’. By contrast, in emergency the time to act is compressed, and pauses in 
action supposedly become luxuries that threaten delay. Delay is a risk. There is no 
time to wait. Elaine Scarry (2011) has illustrated this by showing how ‘claims of 
emergency’ function through an affect of urgency that forestalls processes of 
deliberation and dissensus. Democratic procedures and habits become impediments 
to timely action, since ‘the unspoken presumption is that either one can think or one 
can act, and given that it is absolutely mandatory that an action be performed, 
thinking must fall away.’ (ibid. 7). An example would be the justification for pre-
emptive decisions in the context of the US-led War on Terror. As Massumi (2005: 5) 
puts it in his summary and analysis of George Bush’s decision making: ‘A trustable 
decision is not made in any dangerously deliberative way. A confident decision 
strikes like lightening. It happens’. Emergency is characterized by a stretching or 
extending of the present and a temporary suspension of the transition to a future, 
even as a threatening future becomes present. The second temporality connected to 
the sense of urgency is, then, the interval: the gap or break during which emergency 
action can still make a difference. If action is decisive and happens at the correct 
time, then the emergency can be brought to an end without loss, harm or damage. 
Like the state of exception that is the emergency, the interval is an interruption to 
linear time: it defines a space-time for action in-between the onset of something new 
and the temporary stabilization of a changed present. To govern emergencies and 
through emergency is to enact and act within ‘intervals’.  
The quality of urgency that is inseparable from emergency, and the attendant 
opening up of an interval of and for action, distinguishes emergency from other 
terms that offer resources for sensing and relating to events. For example, 
catastrophe differs from emergency by the absence of the faith that action can make 
a difference. In a catastrophe, intense destruction and damage have materialized; life 
has been ‘overturned’. Because the catastrophic event is on the edge of what is 
governable, catastrophe does not function as an “attribute of management” 
(‘catastrophe management’) nor does it “name a profession” (‘catastrophe planners’) 
(compare with ‘emergency management’ and ‘emergency planners’) (Aradau and 
van Munster 2011: 4). Rather, catastrophe induces a sense of limits; the limits of 
existing ways of governing and the limits of knowledge (ibid. 5). By comparison, 
emergencies involve a demand for immediate, urgent action without delay. As 
Anderson (2016) puts it, in an emergency there is no time, except the time of now, a 
time that is running out. Emergencies are, in this sense, activating: they are events or 
situations where action can still make a difference.   
We could thus say that inseparable from the category of emergency is a 
species of hope: though the outcome of an event or situation is uncertain, correct 
action may make a difference, and that which is threatened might be averted. In a 
situation of emergency, the future is alterable, even as it looms over a suspended 
present. A world of emergencies is far away from a world of pre-ordained fate in 
which the future is already given. In an emergency, some kind of harm, damage or 
loss to something that must be protected is in the midst of emerging, as is a new 
spatial and temporal arrangement that will form through and after the emergency. 
But hope remains. For what is also emerging in an emergency, or at least is 
demanded in situations where a responsibility to protect and an imperative to act 
remains, is action taken to stop, halt or otherwise affect the emergency. Emergency 
and the response to an emergency emerge together, both becoming with the tangle 
of scenes, trajectories, objects and other things that compose people’s everyday lives.                                                                                                                         
 
Section Three: Emergency Hope 
 
Let’s return, then, to the declarations of emergency that I started with and 
trace how they enact and/or disrupt the geohistorically specific distinction between 
emergency and the everyday that the term is founded upon and reproduces. The 
sovereign declaration of a ‘state of emergency’ by St Louis County interrupts the 
smooth, continuous progression from past to present to future. It names an 
anticipated and/or actual exception to the normal state of affairs. There is a 
presumption that harm or damage may emerge and that exceptional action in a time 
limited interval is needed now in order to end the exception. Nevertheless, it 
incorporates the promise of return in the future to a pre-emergency normality. Other 
ways of managing emergencies without a formal declaration of emergency 
incorporate a similar mix of interrupted, linear and cyclical temporalities. Consider, 
for example, the apparatus of ‘UK Civil Contingencies’ (Anderson & Adey 2012). 
Governing any actual event involves moving through linear ‘stages’ of ‘response’ 
and ‘recovery’, with the promise being that appropriate action will result in a return 
to normality. At the same time, government involves perpetual cycles of response-
recovery and preparation, with past preparatory activities (and the techniques 
developed there) folding into future response-recovery actions.  
The sovereign declaration of a state of emergency to govern protest was met 
by intense, activist contestation about what counted as an emergency. Patrisse 
Culler’s statement that I began the paper with is one attempt to mobilise action by 
disrupting what counts as an emergency whilst still using the language of 
emergency to generate a sense of urgency and so mobilise action. Echoing Culler’s 
statement that life is lived in emergency conditions for too many Black people in the 
U.S.A., on social media and in public protests activists redescribed what had become 
ordinary conditions that harm and damage as the real emergency (complementing 
activists’ ways of rendering visible and generating political feeling about the 
harassment and killing of Black men and women in scenes of police violence). For 
example, a twitter hashtag ‘#whichemergency’ was used more than 10, 000 times on 
the day of St Louis County’s declaration of a ‘state of emergency’. People re-
described various distributed urban systems (health care, the penal state, work and 
welfare policy) as conditions that generated emergencies that damaged Black lives. 
In addition to dispersed, frequently repeated scenes of police violence, what was 
politicised under the name of emergency were various spatially and temporally 
extended processes of ‘slow death’ that, in Berlant’s (2007: 754) terms, involve ‘the 
physical wearing out of a population and the deterioration of people in that 
population that is very nearly a defining condition of their experience and historical 
existence’. An example: “#Whichemergency the one where schools are underfunded, 
our neighborhoods are over policed, and our access to resources are slim to none”.  
In the act of politicising processes of slow death, the temporality of 
emergency coexisted and folded with the temporality of the endemic. Typically, the 
endemic is counter to the exceptionality, urgency, and interval that in the previous 
section I argued characterises uses of emergency to govern. The endemic is what 
endures and is more or less adjusted to without scenes of impact (Berlant 2007). 
Renaming the endemic as a series of emergencies interrupts this dispersal of impact. 
It disrupts the line between the endemic and the evental, through a call that response 
is necessary as damages and harms are in the midst of happening (or in this case a 
redistribution of state response and concern from the policing of street protest to 
addressing endemic conditions of harm and damage). There is also, at the same time, 
a sense that these emergencies are not punctual events and there is not a stable 
normality, a non-emergency time, to be returned to. In this respect, activist 
contestation of what counted as emergency politicised conditions that mix different 
temporalities (and are currently being redescribed through terms such as expulsion 
(Sassen 2014) and abandonment/endurance (Povinelli 2011), as well as slow death 
(Berlant 2007)).  
This becoming indistinct of the endemic and evental, or the structural and the 
impactful, produces a specific type of ‘emergency present’. Forms of harm and 
damage repeat in a non-evental time made through institutional repetitions that 
gather to form what Povinelli (2011) terms ‘conditions of endurance’. The present is 
made through accumulations that become the seemingly stable background to be 
lived with; the effects of which are made present in harmful outcomes. There is no 
non-emergency normality to return to, nor are emergencies interruptions or 
eruptions that emerge unexpectedly and take by surprise. Divisions between event 
and non-event have collapsed. One mechanism for producing this indistinction is 
the folding of a sense of emergency into the mode of operation of the very systems 
and infrastructures that, for some, once produced a sense of stability (and thus 
shifting concern and the demand for action from conditions to individual 
symptoms). Poppendieck (1999) tracks how in the USA the systems that once 
promised security have become organised around temporary, time limited, 
conditional emergency provision. At the same time, she shows how marginalised 
lives are lived in movements between those systems – in passages between 
emergency healthcare, emergency shelter and emergency food provision, and in the 
gaps between them. Whilst the terms are a little different, this extended ‘emergency 
present’ is anticipated in a range of new descriptors for understanding the 
temporality of the present. Consider how the term precarity offers a way of 
diagnosing a shared but always varying and often inchoate sense of “predictable 
unpredictability” (Southwood 2011) across diverse, differentiating circumstances 
and scenes. What is understood to characterise precarity is perpetual background 
instability where what is ever present is the possibility of some kind of emergent 
disruption, in part because the present is constituted by the afterlives of previous 
actual and almost-not-quite disruptions (Lorey 2015).  
Precarity is but one example of other emergency times that follow from 
collapsing the distinction between the times of emergency and the times of the 
everyday (see also Taussig (1992) on the ‘nervous system’). One example of where 
lines have blurred is in the seemingly paradoxical phenomenon of a ‘permanent 
state of emergency’ in which states of war and peace blur with one another. The 
claim is that a temporary measure or paradigm—the state of emergency—is now a 
normal part of contemporary liberal-democratic states, something revealed and 
intensified in the context of the ‘war on terror’ (Armitage 2002; Agamben 2002). We 
might think of the regularity in which ‘state of emergency’ legislation has been used 
to police protests, including Black Lives Matter protests, as an example of this 
blurring. Whilst a formal state of emergency has not been in force for the entire 
period, the policing of protest at the level of states has involved the production of 
something like an atmosphere in which a declaration of emergency is always 
possible. However, this blurring of peace and war is not new and cannot be reduced 
to a post 9/11 phenomenon. As well as the becoming ordinary of emergency 
legislation in colonialism (Hussain 2003), Simone Browne (2015) shows how the 
contemporary surveillance practices that underpin and animate the normalisation of 
emergency emerge from long trajectories of anti-Black racism in the United States.  
But of course states are constantly drawing the line between emergencies and 
a normal state of affairs in ways that reaffirm the equation between emergencies and 
exceptional time and attempts to hide forms of endemic harm and damage. The 
declaration of the state of emergency by St Louis County in response to the 
governing of protest as disruption is one such occasion. But even there the lines 
between emergency time and other times blur. The declaration is an operational 
technique that mobilises exceptional police response. However, that response has 
been rehearsed in exercises that, in part, attempt to entrain particular habits of 
response to protest governed as riot. Parts of apparatuses of distributed preparation 
for events, exercises function by bringing future emergencies into the here and now 
through techniques that stage and perform events (Anderson 2010). They reproduce 
and enact the hope that through preparation in the rehearsed present of an ‘as if’ 
emergency, action in the actual emergency can meet the event, bring it to an end and 
return life to a non-emergency everyday. Exercises stage and perform the promise of 
the emergency state: that a non-emergency normality exists and can be protected.  
Back to the contestation of what counted as an emergency by Black Lives 
Matter activists. We can understand it, first, as an expression of the inseparability of 
emergency times and everyday times and, as a consequence, the breaking down of 
the term emergency. The distinction between everyday and emergency has only ever 
been available to some and is produced at the cost of making life into a perpetual 
emergency for others. But, second, it also expresses a political use of emergency as a 
pragmatic-contextual intervention in the present that aims precisely to disrupt what 
has already become normal. What is claimed is not that time is insecure or unstable, 
but that processes of harm, damage, suffering and loss have become endemic and 
everyday. Naming the everyday as an emergency is, in part, a bearing witness to 
and making present how otherwise invisible, silent, violences result in Black lives 
not mattering. It is because a distinction between emergency and the everyday is 
refused and that it is not only the state that is called upon to adjudicate the claim of 
emergency, that the use of a technique and vocabulary of emergency interrupts 
rather than reproduces existing effects and configurations of power (compare with 
Brown’s (1995) argument regarding the contradictory effects of oppositional political 
projects using the tools of the state to seek redress for forms of injury).   
To claim a situation as an emergency is in the case of the Black Lives Matter 
protests and potentially other cases an affirmation and an act of hope. What is 
affirmed is that whatever is threatened in the emergency matters and that urgent 
action is necessary in order to save, protect or enable that life. Bearing witness to the 
ordinary as an emergency that has never been responded to as such becomes one 
way (amongst a number) of affirming that Black lives matter. It places hope in 
emergency as a term that demands and galvanises action, despite the extent to which 
emergency as technique has been central to enactments of state power. And it keeps 
alive the hope that action can make a difference and the situation is transformable 
(as well as the hope that other definitions of the situation are possible). The hope in 
emergency as tool of mobilisation folds another sense of the future into emergency, 
or at least it does if we stay a while with the event of declaration. Writing on hope, 
Ernst Bloch (1988) describes it around the temporality of the ‘not-yet’. Pivotal in his 
attempt to shift the orientation of knowledge from ‘what has become’ to an open 
world, the term ‘not yet’ has a doubled meaning in Bloch’s work (as well as being 
internally divided into the ‘not-yet conscious’ and the ‘not-yet become’). Something 
is ‘not-yet’ in the sense that it is ‘still not’ and may never happen. And something is 
‘not-yet’ in that undetermined futures become with a present full of hopeful 
moments: ‘turning points’ (Bloch 1998: 23) that constitute a crack in linear continuity. 
This means that hope is without guarantees, its ground is not-yet:  
 
‘[h]ope must be unconditionally disappointable ... because it is open in a 
forward direction, in a future-orientated direction; it does not address 
itself to that which already exists. For this reason, hope – while actually in 
a state of suspension – is committed to change rather than repetition, and 
what is more, incorporates the element of chance, without which there can 
be nothing new’.   
(Bloch 1998: 341) 
 
Staying awhile with the hopeful event and structure of the call to recognise this as 
the emergency allows us to think again about the ‘emergency present’. Declaring 
that conditions are emergencies opens up the possibility of a future otherwise in 
which slow and fast anti-Black violences are interrupted and end. It presupposes 
and produces the possibility of the future becoming differently. But, at the same 
time, it changes the character of the now emergency present. Declaring that un- or 
barely- bearable conditions are emergencies and that response is necessary because 
Black lives matter and time remains produces the present as opening. To paraphrase 
Taussig (2002), similarly concerned with the indistinctions between emergency and 
normality, it is an act that produces a ‘spark of hope’ … or hopes to.  
Conclusion: Being in Emergency  
 
Declaring that life is an emergency is one way a spark of hope may be 
generated from within the ‘crisis ordinariness’ (Berlant 2011) of anti-Black violence. 
There is much more to be said about how such sparks of hope become with the other 
political affects that surface as Black Lives Matter connects intense scenes of police 
brutality to other quieter but no less devastating forms of violence. Staying awhile 
with the hopeful moment of taking exception to harmful conditions that have 
become normal allows us to think again about the styles of relating to the future that 
are now folded into emergency. It also reminds us that a different politics of 
emergency might emerge if we start from the use of emergency by non-state and 
non-sovereign actors to disrupt systems of rule. Critical work has taken exception to 
emergency (and in particular the equation between emergency and the legal-political 
technique of the state of exception) on the basis, partly, that invocations of 
emergency produce the effect of continuation, of closing futures. Emergency 
statements or claims or measures, on this account, can be understood as another set 
of mechanisms for ensuring disruptive futures, futures that might become otherwise 
than the present, do not come to pass and existing arrangements repeat and endure 
(albeit in the context of their disruption and possible dissolution). Not least, because 
invocations of emergency with its attendant sense of urgency are taken to foreclose 
the thinking-feeling habits and practices (such as deliberation and dissensus) 
supposedly necessary for the opening of futures and initiating something different. 
This is, though, to understand uses of emergency prospectively – from the promise 
of ending an unwanted future that it is inseperable from – and retrospectively – from 
the position of a future that remains the same as the present was before the 
emergency. In this paper, I have tried to stay awhile with what becomes of the 
present as emergency statements, claims and acts are made and how iterations of 
emergency enact a particular style – or form – of relation between past, present and 
future. What characterises emergency is a simultaneous sense of a time outside of 
what is recognised and felt as everyday time (exceptionality), of a hopeful time for 
action, where the materialisation of damage is temporarily suspended (omnipresent 
present and interval), and the time of a present becoming.   
Emergency involves, then, a specific relation with ‘the future’ that cannot be 
smoothly incorporated into narratives of the loss of the otherness of the future. The 
use of the vocabulary of emergency and state of emergency in some Black Lives 
Matter actions enacts this emergency temporality, but it also brings its implicit 
separation between emergency and the everyday into question by connecting 
racialised police violence to material conditions that unevenly distribute value and 
vulnerability as race intersects with gender, class and sexuality. Compare this with 
the formal declaration of a state of emergency by St Louis County. Governing protest 
through this legal-political measure depends on a spatial and temporal demarcation 
of both the possible emergency and of the state of emergency. By contrast, the 
declaration that life is a state of emergency attempts to make dispersed conditions 
that are inseperable from ordinary life into an Event. Food poverty, unemployment, 
mortality rates and so on constitute the measured traces of a state of emergency that 
is normally without a single scene of visible impact. But it does so without 
demarcating the site of emergency in separation from the everyday, precisely 
because the emergency is the everyday and the everyday is an emergency, albeit one 
that goes unrecognized by many and so requires naming. Declaring ongoing 
conditions to be emergencies is a hopeful act in that it aims to interrupt those 
conditions by making what has become ordinary into an exception. The declaration 
that life is an emergency is an attempt to halt conditions, to step out of the 
continuous time of the linear reproduction of the emergency/everyday. Because it is 
propelled by a sense of necessity rather than of the ‘right time’, the declaration is not 
the time of cairos – ‘the abrupt and sudden conjunction where decision grasps 
opportunity and life is fulfilled in the moment’ (Agamben 1993: 111). Life is not 
‘fulfilled’ in the moment of Patrisse Cullors declaring that ‘this is a state of 
emergency’; far from it. The hoped for future is not-yet.  
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